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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
0~-, THE 
State of Utah 
CLIFTON BURR, ET. AL., 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
vs. 
RALPH E. CHILDS, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No. 7995 
APPELLANr·s BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiff was employed by the defendant, Ralph E. 
Childs a general contractor, to perform work and labor 
upon a building known as the Union High School, Roose-
velt, Utah. This building is one that was classified as a 
public works under the provisions of Section 34-12-6, 
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tT.l 1.A. l!f>:l, in that it wa~ to be paid for in whole by 
pnblit· moni<'~ and was constructed under the direction 
and <·oJd rol or a political subdivision or district of the 
~tat<·, ll:tllll'l~, tl11• school distri<~t. NOTE: (The com-
]daint in tl1i~ <·a~e citl'd the statutory provisions of the 
Hl.t.:: r .<~.A.~ hmv<·\·<·•· the identical statutes are now set 
forth in the 1 !f.>:: 1· .C. A. and statutory references in this 
hril'f will IH· to the 1953 U.C.A.) 
.\t that ti11H' and at all tiJnf~s thereafter, Section 
::-t-1 :!-::, lT.C .. \. 1 !J;,::, provided that all persons employed 
on pnhli(' works should be paid not less than the prevail-
ing rate of wages per hour for work of a similar nature 
performed in the localit~·: and Section 34-12-8, U.C.A. 
1953 provided that 40 hours constituted a working week 
on all ~uch works and undertakings and that one and a 
half ( Vf2) times the regular rate of pay would be paid 
for all work performed by an individual or individuals 
over 40 hours in one week. 
The prevailing rate of wages per hour is the rate 
determined h~· the Industrial Com1nission of Utah and 
Rection 34-12-6, P.C.A. 1953, provides that their decision 
in such matters shall be final. 
On July 15, 1949, a list of prevailing rates of pay per 
hour was published h~· the Industrial Commission and on 
July 15, 1950, a new or revised list of rates was likewise 
established and published h~· the Industrial Commission. 
The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant had failed 
to pa~· then1 either the prevailing hourly wage or over-
time wage and they filed an action in the District 
Court of the Fourth .Judicial District in and for the 
County of lTtah on behalf of themselves and for 
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all other~ :::;imilarly situated under the provisions of 
Rule :23 ..:\ (3), rtah Rules of Civil Procedure, to which 
the defendant filed a n10tion to dis1niss. The District 
Court granted the 1notion to dis1niss on February 24, 
1~lj~3 by a 1ninute entry and on ~{arch 18, 1953 by an 
rnnended 1ninute entry stated that the reason for the 
~!~ courts ruling was its belief that it did not have jurisdic-
tion to hear and determine the cause. 
~>laintiffs appealed; defendant then moved to dismi 
.-~~;he appeal on the ground it was prematurely taken. 
- ·>n June 1st, 1953, remittitur issued out of the 
.·~-:3upreme Court and on June 5th, 1953 the lm,ver cour 
~':::~ntered a formal order of dismissal. 
:S U ~l.MA.K Y U~' A.Klt U MENr_r 
~r-: The question involved herein has not been hereto-
11'3 fore detennined in this state. However it has been raised 
: ·>·= in other jurisdictions and the authority of an employee 
to sue has been sustained on at least three different 
theories. 
J: 1. General liability created by statute without pro-
~][r viding for a remedy, may be enforced by appropriate 
:~ common-law remedy. 
2. That the employee may sue as a 3rd party bene-
f}fi ficiary. 
~m[~ 3. That the failure to comply with the statute 
~~ creates a tort liability. 
ARGUMENT 
1. General liability created by statute without pro-
'l:idin!f for a remedy may be enforced by appropriate 
common-law remedy. 
Chapter 12 of Title 3-1, U.C.A. 1953, does not provide 
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for any action or .remedy by the eutployed individual. 
The only proposed procedure for violations is contained 
1n Section 34-12-5, U.C.A. 1953, which provides: 
"It shall be the duty of such public body award-
ing the contract, and its officers and agents, to take 
cognizance of complaints of all violations of the 
provisions of this act cormnitted in the course of the 
execution of a contract. When in their opinion the 
provisions of this act have been violated it shall 
be the duty of the 1nembers of the said board to make 
a written report of such violation to the industrial 
commission of the state of Utah who shall, upon 
giving notice to the said contractor, finally deter-
mine whether such violations have been committed 
and in the event that they so find, after proper hear-
ing, the said industrial commission shall make an 
order authorizing the said board to withhold and 
retain from the contract price a sum equal to the 
amount of the penalties assessed against the said 
contractor. The sum so withheld and retained by the 
board shall be by the said board promptly paid over 
to the industrial commission of the state of Utah. 
From the sum retained and withheld by virture of 
the order of the industrial commission, there shall 
first be deducted and paid over to the several em-
ployees, workmen or mechanics, who have not re-
ceived by the prevailing rates as provided for by 
this act, a sum equal to the difference of the sum 
that they have actually received and the sum they 
would have become entitled to, if they had been paid 
the prevailing rate. The balance of the sun1 remain-
ing shall be paid over to the industrial commission 
4 
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for the purpose of establishing a fund to enforce 
the provisions of this net, and the said n1onies shall 
be coYered into the ~tate treasury, and the state 
trea~ urer shall be the custodian of the said fund, 
and all disbursenwnts therefrom shall be paid by 
hi1n upon Youcher~ authorized by the industrial com-
Ini~sion of rtnh and signed by a member of the 
connni~sion and the secretary thereof." 
The aboYe quoted section imposes a duty upon 
the public body to report violations, but nowhere 
is there set forth any duty upon the individual 
"\Yorkinan deprived of his statutory protection to report 
to the school board and nowhere does it state that his 
right to recover is conditional upon his petitioning the 
school board and then bringing an action in mandamus to 
cmnpel them to file a complaint with the Industrial Com-
Inission if they fail to act. 
If it be maintained that the only remedy provided 
for the correction of statutory violations is contained in 
Chapter 12, then it must follow that no remedy exists. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Logan City v. Ind. 
Comm. of Ftah, 85 U. 131, 39 P. 2 769, had before it a case 
that determined that issue. There the individual em-
ployees filed a complaint with the Industrial Commission 
alleging non-payment of the prevailing wage rates. The 
statute, Laws of lTtah 1933, c. 39, section 4 is identical 
to 34-12-5, F.C.A. 1953, and is set forth verbatim in the 
opinion. rrhe T ndu~trial Commission found that the em-
ploy<><>~ had not heen properly paid and ordered an 
award; Logan Cit~T appealed. The Supre1ne Court speak-
ing through Straup, C. J. overruled and nullified the 
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onl<·r ol' thP lndu~trial Commission saying at page 771: 
· • rl,lw di~po~ition of the case does not require a 
('Oil~id(•ration ol' all the points urged, for that the 
('Olllllli~~ion, a~ we tl1ink, wa~ without jurisdiction to 
h<·ar or d<'1<'nnine sw·l1 a controversy as here pre-
~<·nt<'d, for nei tlier hy th<~ "Industrial Commission" 
uor "\Vorkmen':-; Colllpensation Act," R.S. Utah 
l~l:t~, titl<· ·H-1-1 <'1 :-;eq., nor b~· Laws of Utah 1933, 
<'. :~!), lwn·tol'on· referred to, is any such power con-
fern·d on the <·<,Jmnission. The controversy so pre-
Henh·<l involYPs a <li:-:pute, as to the amount of com-
]Wn~ation to which the persons so employed by the 
<"it~· are entitled. 'Vhat is so presented is in the 
nature of a proceeding or action to recover compen-
sation for work and labor performed. By the cit~T 
it is contended that those rendering the service were 
paid in full in accordance with an agreement entered 
into between them and the city. On the other hand, 
those performing sneh service, while admitting or 
not disputing payment in full in accordance with 
the agreement, assert that under the law they were 
entitled to additional cmnpensation and prayed for 
an order requiring the city to pay it. The matter 
thus affected individual rights and interests of those 
involved in the controversy the same as in any action 
or proceeding where one is claiming and demanding 
compensation for services rendered and performed, 
which to hear and determine invokes judicial action 
and power. The con11nission is no such tribunal 
authorized to exercise such a function or power. It 
chiefly is an adn1inistrative body, and while in the 
exercise of its functions it is required to pass on 
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-~::"· 
fad~ and to determine it~ aetion by thP !'ad~ l'ound. 
in a sen~~:· exercising in such n'~lw<'t a qua~i judicial 
function, a function lying midwa~· lwtwPPn Ininis-
terial and judicial functions, ~·d, it i~ not clothed 
with power to exercisP judicia 1 ad~ or functions to 
deride or ndjndieate rights of persons or property 
in specific ea~P~ "'here such rights and the demanded 
relief are the basis of the action or proceeding. 
rnder our Constitution. art. 8. Section l, all judicial 
power i~ vested in the Senate sitting as a court of 
impeaclnnent. and in the Supre1ne and district courts 
and justices of the peace and such other courts in-
ferior to the Supreme Court as may be established 
h:~ law. As 1nay be established by law means as 
provided by statute creating a "court," etc. The 
Industrial Con1n1ission is not such or any court. It, 
as created h:~ the statute, being an administrative 
board or emmnission, any attempt to confer on it 
the exercise of judicial powers and functions is 
futile. and violative of the constitutional provision 
referred to. It is unnecessary to now determine 
whether section 4 of the Laws of Utah 1933 is or 
is not in violation of such provision, for that the 
presented case does not fall within such section. It 
is enough to determine, as we do, that the power of 
the com1nission invoked and exercised hy it is judi-
cial in character, and that no such power is or may 
be conferred upon it.'' 
The Supreme Court did not say that the application 
"·as procedurally defective and that the men could not 
apply to the cmmnission directly. 
The Supre1ne Court did 11ot ~a~, that the jurisdiction 
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of tlw <'tllllllli~~ioll could only be invoked by an applica-
tion by the Puhli<~ hody awarding the work. 
'l'lt~• ~upn·tnP Court did say that the Industrial 
( 'tllttttti:-;:-;ion lw·k<'d the power to perfol'ln the acts per-
lllittt·d h~· tit<' stat ut<~ and that it could not assume juris-
did ion and tnalw an award. 
'I' It<· lat'k of po\\'<~ r is a matter of substance. It must 
follow that th<· ~anw lack of power would exist regardless 
of tit<' pn~t·<'dural approach and that as a result if no 
powpr <'xi:-;b in the courts to hear and determine this 
<"oHtro\'<'r:-;y then the purpose and the intent of the legis-
lation is defeated. 
The leading ease on the theory that general liability 
t'reated by statute without providing for a remedy may 
be enforced hy appropriate common-law remedy is that 
of Cit:· of Phoenix v. Drinkwater, 46 Ariz. 470, 52 P. 
2d ll 7!J. In that case the plaintiff sued for wages due 
from defendant for Garcia and Salazar which were as-
~ig-ned to the plaintiff. It was alleged that by statute 
Garcia was entitled to be paid $-! per day and only 
received $3.20 and that Salazar was siinilarly paid. Both 
men accepted the lesser sum and later filed a written 
demand which wa~ refused. Defendant defended on the 
ground that the statute did not expressly give a right of 
action to the laborer to recover the difference between 
what was paid him and what he should have been paid. 
In that case the court at page 1177 stated: 
"If the strict rule as contended for be applied, 
we would have the situation in this case of the Leg-
islature giving a right with one hand, and denying a 
remedy for an invasion thereof with the other. It 
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!C:: 
i:s abo a general rule t hn t. in determini11p; t ht> liH'an-
ing of :sta tnh':s, we mn:st consider both t ht> Pvi 1 to 
be rernedied and the rP:snlt whieh the LPp;i~latnre 
de:si rP:s to reach. \Ye ha VP dP:seribed tlw pnrpo~P of 
the rnininnun \Hlg'<.' law in State v .• Jaa~tad, supra, 
a:s follows: 
· · ~lininnun wage law:s, increasingly prevalent in 
recent years. are obviously, and generally avowedly, 
based upon the theory that it is a n1atter of general 
and public concern that wage-earners should not 
haYe the amount of their earnings determined solely 
by inten:se cmnpetition under the law of supply and 
demand, which. as history has shown, frequently 
re:sult:' in a general deterioration of the physical 
and nwral stamina of a nation, and that human labor 
i:s not a comn1odity in the sense that material pro-
ducts are, but is something higher and different, 
and it therefore follows that the workers are not to 
be considered as mere machines to be run at high 
speed with the least possible expense, and then 
scrapped as their usefulness is exhausted, but are 
an integral and vital part of society itself, and 
society must, for its own sake, if not for theirs, see 
that they are given the protection which they cannot 
unaided secure for themselves. Such being the case, 
the nwre enlightened Legislatures have determined 
that the state will, as a matter of public policy, fix a 
wage below which it will not go, and the National 
Industrial Heeover~, Act ( 48 Stat. 195) is endeavor-
ing, h~, one rneans or another, to extend the principle 
to private business.'' 
In concluding its discussion of this problern the court 
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'' \\' P think we should apply to such a statute the 
]>l'ilwipl<' ~tat<'d in Pollard v. Baile~·, 20 Wall. (87 
l . ...._, ) r'":•)() ,.. )'"' 22 -
·'""'· .~_ , ;>:.... 1, L. Ed. 376, as follows: 
'' .\ ~·t·nPral lial,ility created by statute without 
a n·tltt·d~· may he enforced by an appropriate com-
mon-law action." 
rl'he t·ourt in Filardo v. Foh~~· Bros., Inc., et al. 279 
~. Y. :217, 7S X.E. :2(1 -t~O had a case where the employee 
"a~ ~ming for over-titiH~ at the rate of llf2 times his hour-
I~· rat<·. .\ ~tatute provided for a maximum of 8 hours 
work a day and that ~u('h over-time pay should be award-
ed for an~· hours worked over the aforesaid 8 hours. The 
jury found plaintiff had worked 1172 over-time hours 
and ga YP the plaintiff judgment for $2492.36 with in-
tPrP~t. The appellate court reversed the judgment and 
dismissed the complaint because the statute didn't give 
the en1ployee the right to sue. The Supreme Court 
reversed the appellate court saying at page 482: 
''There can be little question that the statute 
was passed for the benefit and protection of the la-
borer and, in such a case, a party who has ''suffered 
from a disregard and violation of the duty (imposed 
b)· statute) has a cause of action for his damages 
against the one who has disregarded his duty,'' even 
though the statute does not explicitly provide for 
such a re1nedy. Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe 
Co., 243 N.Y., 458, 154 N.E. 309, 311; see, also, 
Bruce's Juices v. A1nerican Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 
751, 67 S. Ct. 1015, 1019 ~ D 'Oench, Duhn1e & Co. v. 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corporation, 315 U.S. 447, 
10 
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-!3(i--l~)~, li:2 ~. Ct. ti7ti, (i7S, ti7~). Sli L. l£d. !()(). With 
the benefieial purposes ot' the ~tatnte so nutnifest, 
if plaintiff may not ~nP to enforeP it, the benefits 
accorded would indeed be empty and illusory. He 
would find hilnself in thl• position of having been 
giYen a benefit he i~ unable to enjoy, a right he is 
helpless to enforce. 
Analogously, ::;tate nnnnnun1 \\'age laws have 
been interpreted to permit suit by an aggrieved em-
ployee to recover the wages therein specified, though 
the statute merely made payment at less than the 
specified rate criminally punishable and did not ex-
pressly grant a right of civil action. See MeN ulty 
v. City of X e,,~ York, 238 N.Y. 29, 143 N.E. 781; City 
of Phoenix v. Drinkwater, 46 Ariz. 470, 52 P. 2d 
1175; cf. Austin v. City of New York, 258 N.Y. 113, 
179 X.E. 313; Cmnpbell v. City of New York, 128 
:Jiisc. 382, 219 N.Y.S. 131. 
In an alrnost identical case in 1949, the Supreme 
Court of Alabama in Boggs v. Kershaw, Butler Engi-
neers, :25:2 Ala. 265, 40 S. 2d 320 sustained the right of an 
employee to bring suit and on page 323 of their opinion 
cited Filardo v. Foley Bros., Inc., et al., 279 N.Y. 217, 
78 N.E. 2d -!8:2 where the New York court stated: 
''While the statute does not in so many words 
grant to the e1nployee a cause of action if such com-
pensation is not received, it is settled that such 
remedial legislation is to be given a liberal construc-
tion to effectuate it:-; purpose and ai1n. See National 
Labor Relations Board v. I-Iearst Publications, 322 
U.S. 111, 129, 64 S. Ct. 851, 859, 88 L. Ed. 1170; South 
11 
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( 'lti<·ago ( 'oal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 
:.!;l!l, ~(i0, (iO N. Ct. ;>44, :->4!>, K4 L. Ed. 732; Warner v. 
Ooltra, :.!!l:~ l'.N. 155. 158, ;>G S. Ct. 46, 47, 79 L. Ed. 
:.!;)4; \\'ailing v. Patton-Tulley Transp. Co., 6 Cir., 
I ::4 1•'. :.!d 945." 
allCI in Hto\'<•r v. \\'iu~ton Bros. Co. 185 Wash. -t16, 55 
P. :.!d ~:.!1. tit<· <·ourt at page 824 said: 
· · Tlt<·r<· i:-i a \\'ell-n~<·<Jgnize<l rule to the effect 
that "·lt<•Jl(•\'<•r tl1<· law recognizes a right it gives a 
n·rrH·d~· and this rule~ applies to statutory as well as 
to l'OitlltlOn-law right~. 1 C.J. 986." 
This is the law gt·n<·rall~· and is applied even though 
wages alone an· not a~ked. Thus in Gabriel v. Borowy 
(~fass.) 19-J-9, 83 X.E. 2d ..J-35, at page 438 the court 
stated: 
· · \Yl1ere a :'tatutory right is conferred upon a 
elass of individuals as distinguished from the pub-
lic at large but no remedy is provided by the statute 
for the enforcement of the right, the right may be 
asserted h~- any appropriate common law remedy 
that is available. Otherwise, the right would be use-
less and illusory. Jeffrey v. Blue-Hill Turnpike 
Corp., 10 ::\[as~. 368: Russell l\1:ills v. County Com-
missioners of Plymouth, 16 Gray 347; Attorney Gen-
eral Y. Williams, 17 -l- ::\[ass. 476, 55 N.E. 77, 47 L.R.A. 
314: Berdos v. Tremont & Suffolk Mills, 209 Mass. 
489, 95 N.E. 876, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 797; West's Case, 
313 l\iass. 146, -l-G N.E. 2d 760; Irving Trust Co. v. 
l\{aryland Casnalt~- Co., 2 Cir., 83 F. 2d 16R, 111 
A.L.R. 781; City of Phoenix v. Drinkwater, 46 Ariz. 
470, 52 P. 2d 1175; l\icNulty v. New York, 238 N.Y. 29 
12 
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1-!3 N.E. 7~1; . :\bounader Y. StrohwPyer & Arpe Co., 
243 N.Y. -l5S, 15-l N.E. 309." 
The Labor Code of California, See. 1770-1775 is 
identical to that of the ~tate of Utah exePpt that there is 
no provision si1nilar to ~~4-1~-;'}. " 7 hile there are no cases 
ari~ing- under these section~, there are two cases, Adams 
Y. \Yolff, 190 P. ~d GG5 and Parker v. Bowron (1953) 254 
P. ~d G. wherein it wa~ conceded that the employees had 
the right to sue in their own nan1es. These cases arose 
under the city charters of San Francisco and Los Angeles 
respectiYely. The charter provisions are not set forth 
in sufficient detail to be of help though the parts referred 
to are con1parable to the State law. It is fair to assume 
however that they are similar and that no statutory au-
thority expressly permitting employees to sue existed. 
2. The employee may sue as a 3rd party beneficiary. 
In the case of Stover v. \Vinston Bros. Co. supra, the 
plaintiff brought an action to recover wages pursuant to 
a contract between the defendant corporation and the 
City of Seattle. The City of Seattle by ordinance had 
fixed as a matter of public policy the wages and condi-
tions of labor on public works. These requirements were 
incorporated into the contract for construction so that 
the employees were protected by ordinance and also by 
contract. The court held that the employees could sue 
as third party beneficiaries saying at page 824: 
''Here we have a situation known to the con-
tracting parties which made it the duty of the con-
tractor to pay the city wage scale to all workmen 
who might he mnployed. The contract, by its ter1ns, 
required such payment to a designated class and 
13 
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wa~ as <·x plicit as it possibly could be rnade at the 
time it wa~ entered into. While, incidentally, the 
l'ity might r<·<~eive benefits therefrom, its rnain pur-
pm;e watoi, without douht, to provide to the workmen 
au ad<·~ tuate wage." 
"\\' tih full knowledge of what the obligation 
wa:-;, t II<· <'Oil t rador, I' or a valuable consideration, 
a.!.!,T<·<·d to }m~· l1is workmen when employed accord-
ing to a :'JH•<·ifi<·d wage ~tale. Notwithstanding that 
no workman was a part~r to the consideration, we 
llln:-:t hold that all workmen were, by the contract, 
g-iYPn a substantive right, the right to receive the 
:-:pecified wage, "·hich right was a direct liability of 
the eontractor to the workmen, and therefore the 
worlnnen may sue on the contract in their own 
right.'' 
Thus in A us tin Bridge Co. v. Teague, 137 Tex. 119, 
149 S.\V. 2d G7-t, there "·as a statute requiring that work-
men engaged in doing or perfonning work on a public 
project were to receive certain per diem wages. The 
State Highway Commission was required to ascertain 
the "general prevailing rate of per diem wages." The 
statute made it mandatory for the contractor to pay not 
less than the prevailing wage rates so fixed by the Com-
mission. Defendant paid the plaintiff wages due as an 
unskilled laborer, plaintiff, claiming he should have had 
the wages for skilled labor, sued. He conceded that he 
was not specifically authorized h~T statute to sue but the 
court sustained the lower courts verdict for the plaintiff 
maintaining at page 676: 
"It is true that these ren1edies or provisions for 
14 
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the enforcen1ent of the ~tatntt~ may indirectly aid 
workn1en in ~eenring the payment of the 1niniu1U1n 
rate of wage~~ but we do not rPganl then1 as being 
exelusiYe. Such provisions are penal in nature and 
like all penal la "-~ wen~ intended as deterrents to 
contractors not to pay less than the 1ninimum rate of 
wages. Their enforce1nent, however, does not actual-
ly pay the 1ninimun1 rate of wages prescribed, which 
is the pri1nary objective of the statute, and we can 
conceive of no good reason why the legislature would 
give worklnen the right to require a contractor of 
public works to pay them a minimum rate of wages, 
and then deny them the right to sue the contractor 
for such wages. We think the Act contemplates the 
authority of workmen to enforce their right to be 
paid such wages by suit against the contractor." 
"We are also of the view that appellee does 
have the right to 1naintain this suit as a third party 
beneficiary under the contract in suit. The provi-
sions of the Act with respect to payment of mini-
mulTI wages are required to be inserted in the public 
works contract and become a part of it. They were 
so inserted in the instant case. Such provisions of 
the contract are for the benefit and protection of the 
laborer, and the generally accepted rule is that a 
contract 1nade by two parties for the benefit of a 
third party may be enforced by the suit of the latter. 
Such is the holding in Hearn v. Ralph Sollitt & Sons 
Const. Co., Tex. Civ. App., 93 S.W. 2d 551, wherein 
the similar federal wage law was involved, and the 
eourt construed the contract as authorizing the la-
borer to sue thereon as a third party beneficiary.'' 
15 
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rrhe New York court in Fata v. S. A. Healy Co. 289 
N.Y. 401, ·Hi N.E. ~<l 339, which was followed in Filardo 
v. l~'oiP~' Bro:-:. ~!)7 N.Y. 217,78 N.E. 2d 480, followed this 
dod rinP a~ it i:-; :-:tate<l in the second paragraph of the 
R~·llalllt:-: in the Fata case: 
'' 1\ n <·mployP<~ could maintain common law 
:wtion a~ain:-:t <·tnplo~·<~r for breach of contract be-
t W<·<·u <'tup}<,~·<'r and <·ity':-: agency, which required 
<·lltplo~·<·J' to pa~· wages at least at prevailing rate 
fix<'d in a<·<·ordam·p with statute as stated in sched-
ule annexed to contract, as against contention that 
:-:tatutor~· remedy was exclusive. Labor Law, Section 
~~0. :-:uhd. ~.a~ amended hy Laws 1935, c. 300." 
3. That the faif,n·e to comply with the statute 
rreates a tort liability. 
The courts of Kentucky have approached the prob-
lem fron1 a different standpoint. In Consolidated Tel. 
Co. v. Stevens, J{y. 1943, 293 Ky. 313, 168 S.W. 2d 1012, 
a female telephone operator sued for over-time basing 
her claim on state statutes setting minimum hours and 
minimum wages for women. She was not working or 
covered by a formal contract. The Supreme Court sent 
the case back for further proceedings saying at page 
1013: 
'' Frmn our consideration of the allegations of 
the petition, we are led to assume that the appellee 
misconceived the nature and character of her action, 
as one based on contract, where seeking recovery of 
extra compensation for over-time hours of like 
character of service rendered her employer, without 
contract or agreement had with it that she was to 
16 
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lll!aieL 
be paid therefor, and that her netion, ~l'Pking cmn-
pen~ation or damagP~ sustained by rPa~on of tlw 
defendant·~ violation of the penal ~ta tntr lH'l'P in-
volved, was properly of ex delicto character and 
authorized bY sections -lSGGb-~ (KRS 337.380) and 
-!767 a-17 (KRS 337-360), J(entncky Statutes, or 
chapter 103 of the penal statute of the Session Acts 
of 1938. '' 
CONCLUSION 
Looking again to the Logan City case, it will be 
observed that the court clearly implied that the problem 
of collecting wages and enforcing the statutory rights 
conferred upon an e1nployee is a judicial problem and 
involves judicial action. This is in entire accord with the 
principles above set forth. Clearly if the District Court 
be sustained we have a case where a right, benefit and 
protection is afforded that would be unenforceable. It 
is requested therfor that the order of dismissal be re-
versed and that the case be remanded for further pro-
ceedings according to law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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